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Violent Crime driven by income inequality between countries 
 
By Mario COCCIAa† 
 
Abstract. The literature has suggested several approaches to explain violent crime, such as 
the heat hypothesis that more violence is associated to very hot temperature. However, the 
manifold determinants of violent crime in society are hardly known. This study shows that, 
controlling the climate, the intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) can be explained by 
the high level of income inequality, both in hot tropical areas and in temperate regions of 
the globe. Overall, then, the socioeconomic inequality is one of factors that generates 
aversive social environments and, as a consequence, a deteriorated human behavior leading 
to high rates of intentional homicides in society.  
Keywords. Temperature, Inequality, Violent crime, Intentional homicides, Heat hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
ne of the scientific problems of violent crime in social psychology is 
centered around a main issue: what environmental factors cause violent 
crime and aggressive behavior in society? This paper has two goals. The 
first is to show that hot temperatures, per se, provide a partial explanation of 
deteriorated human functioning leading to violent crime in society. The second is 
to stress the importance of the income inequality that negatively affect the mental 
health and to provide evidence that the high rates of violent crime at country level 
can be explained by high economic inequality in society, controlling the factor 
climate (Coccia, 2017e). This study is important in psychological sciences because 
The United Nations General Assembly in 2015 adopted the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, addressing the need for violence prevention at an 
unprecedented scale (United Nations, 2015). In fact, determinants of the 
environmental violence have become more and more a critical argument in several 
scientific fields that consider different factors, such as poverty (Hsieh & Pugh, 
1993; Lee, 2016), resource scarcity (Cozens, 2008), high population (Christens & 
Speer, 2005), social factors (Perkins et al., 1993), characteristics of the inhabitants 
(Jencks, 1992), psychological factors (Kuo & Sullivan, 2001; Perkins et al., 1993; 
Anderson, 1987), etc. A main research stream in social psychology is based on heat 
hypothesis: hot temperature can increase aggressive behavior and violence in 
society (Baron & Bell, 1976; Carlsmith et al., 1979; Anderson, 1989; Anderson & 
Anderson, 1996). In particular, some scholars argue that hot climate can directly 
increase feelings of hostility and indirectly increase aggressive thoughts inter- and 
intra-groups (Anderson, 2001), but Simister & Cooper (2005, pp.7-8, original 
emphasis) discuss about some cities in Puerto Rico (with hot climate), which 
appear to be ‘outliers’ in having low crime rates relative to some U.S. cities (cf. 
also Simister & Van de Vliert, 2005). In general, this heat hypothesis has 
influenced several research fields of the psychological sciences, neuroscience, 
behavioral and cognitive sciences of crime (Baron, 1972; Anderson, 1987; 
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Anderson et al., 1997; DeFronzo, 1984; Simister & Van de Vliert, 2005; Van de 
Vliert & Smith, 2004). Recently, Van Lange et al., (2016) propose a model that 
seeks to understand the variation in aggression and violence in terms of differences 
in climate. These scholars show that lower average temperature and larger variation 
in seasonal temperature influence individuals and groups to adopt a slower life 
strategy and a stronger focus on self-control (Van Lange et al., 2016). However, 
current theoretical frameworks about environmental violence are not 
comprehensive approaches because it is clear that there are at least some factors 
about aggressive behavior and violent crime in society that these studies have 
trouble explaining. In social psychology, several researchers have implicitly 
assumed that the hot climate is a prime factor of the violence and aggressive 
behavior. This study here challenges this conventional wisdom by highlighting the 
critical role of socioeconomic factors on human behavior that can lead to violent 
crime in society. Although ‚social psychologists are characteristically less critical 
of theories than is desirable‛ (Greenwald & Ronis, 1981, p.136), it would seem 
useful to explore other environmental factors and related interactions, from 
socioeconomic studies, that can support and integrate the approaches of social 
psychology in explaining the high rates of violent crime and aggressive behavior in 
areas both with hot and with temperate climate. Hence, this study here challenges 
by arguing that the high socioeconomic inequality, controlling the latitude (a proxy 
of the climate), can generate aversive environments for human behavior and violent 
crime in society as a result. The hypothesis of the study here will be substantiated 
with statistical analysis to develop an integrative theoretical framework to current 
psychological approaches that can clarify and explain, whenever possible a main 
relation relationship between human behavior and environmental violence. In order 
to position the analysis here within the existing literature, this paper begins by 
reviewing some studies and by discussing the theoretical framework of this study. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and working hypothesis  
Understanding where violent crime happens can provide vital information to 
explaining why it happens (Christens & Speer, 2005; Lee, 2016). It has been 
discussed in literature that environmental stressors, emanate from less than 
favourable conditions in built or natural locations, generate various psychological 
health problems in society (Lepore et al., 1991). Some studies show that the 
crowding of specific areas has a significant negative influence on social relations 
and generates a deteriorated human functioning conducive to aggressive behavior 
(Altman, 1975; Baum & Paulus, 1991). Many studies, as said above, have showed 
that hot temperature seems to induce environmental violence (Simister & Van de 
Vliert, 2005). The theoretical framework of these studies is based on the heat 
hypothesis: hot temperatures can increase (under some conditions) aggressive 
behavior of humans. In this research field, Anderson & Anderson (1996, p. 748) 
predict that warmer cities will be positively associated with more violent behavior. 
Van de Vliert et al., (1999, p.51) claim that: ‚the highest rates of violence are 
associated with temperatures about 24°C; whereas Simister & Cooper (2005) 
consider violence to be more common if temperatures are more than 24°C‛. Van de 
Vliert et al., (1999) endeavour to explain the results with a relation between 
climate, culture and human behavior. Anderson (2001) confirmed that higher rates 
of aggression are in hot climate rather than cooler one. Simister & Van de Vliert 
(2005) argue that other factors of the climate (in addition to the temperature) are 
also relevant to environmental violence, such as rainfall and humidity. Specific 
studies, for explaining the high rates of violent crime, focus on ‘cultural 
masculinity’ of geoeconomic areas (Van de Vliert et al., 1999). Instead, Simister & 
Cooper (2005, p.52) suggest a biological explanation of the heat hypothesis by 
considering the adrenaline of the body (‚which is secreted into the blood at high 
temperatures, as part of a thermal control mechanism in humans‛, cf. also Duke et 
al., 2013). Instead, other studies argue that hot weather negatively affects physical 
factors of geographical areas that reduce economic resources and, as a 
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consequence, increase the poverty and violence (e.g., farm output may be reduced 
by extreme weather, cf., Van de Vliert et al., 2000). Lower levels of 
democratization of countries can also be another factor related to high rates of 
violence and crime in society (Simister & Cooper, 2005).  
The debate in these topics also concerns the temperature-aggression relationship 
(Anderson et al., 2000). The literature shows that the relationship between 
temperature and violence can be linear or a curve with a Negative Affect Escape 
(called NAE; cf., Bell, 1992; 2005; Anderson, 1989; Anderson & DeNeve, 1992; 
Anderson et al., 2000; Rotton & Cohn, 2002; Rotton, 1986; 1993). Baron & 
Ransberger (1978) indicated that the frequency of collective violence and ambient 
temperature were curvilinearly related. Instead, Bushman et al., (2005), using 
Minneapolis data, suggest a rectilinear rather than a curvilinear relationship. 
Although some studies seem to support the curvilinear relationship (cf., Rotton & 
Cohn, 2000a; Van de Vliert et al., 1999), Anderson and colleagues have claimed 
that these results are methodologically weak (cf., Anderson, 1989; Anderson et al., 
2000). Rotton & Cohn (2004) argued that the curvilinear relationship holds only 
when escape to cooler temperatures is not readily available, but identifying other 
such circumstances and their practical and theoretical implications would be a 
valuable direction for the analysis of the heat–aggression relationship (cf., Bell, 
2005, p.72).  
In social studies, the inequality is a vital factor to explain some dynamics in 
society because negatively influences wellbeing and economic growth (Aaberge & 
Mogstad, 2011; Herzer & Vollmer, 2012; Elbers et al., 2008; cf. also Ferreira et al., 
2016). Fajnzylber et al., (2002, 1-7) argue that: ‚Crime rates and inequality are 
positively correlated within countries and, particularly, between countries, and this 
correlation reflects causation from inequality to crime rates, even after controlling 
for other crime determinants. …an increase in income inequality has a significant 
and robust effect of raising crime rates‛. Hsieh & Pugh (1993) claim that poverty 
and income inequality are associated with violent crime. Ouimet (2012) also argues 
that economic development, inequality and poverty are significant predictors of the 
homicide rate for all countries. Blau & Blau (1982) argue that economic inequality 
is at the root of violent crime in the United States and Poveda (2011) finds that 
inequality has positive impacts on the homicide rates in seven major cities in 
Colombia. In general, there is a growing consensus that problematic socioeconomic 
conditions, such as unemployment, income inequality and poverty, are underlying 
causes of violent crime and homicide. Social studies have two competing theories 
for explaining the mechanisms through which inequality may foster environmental 
violence (Coccia, 2017e). The first theoretical framework is by Becker (1968). The 
crime is a function of an individual's calculations in weighing the expected utility 
of crime against the utility of using the same time and resources to pursue legal 
activities. This theory suggests that inequality leads to crime by placing low-
income individuals who have low returns from market activity in proximity to 
high-income individuals who have things that are worth taking (Kelly, 2000). In 
particular, although poverty remains fixed, a larger income gap between the poor 
and the rich people would lead to rising criminal behavior because the expected 
gains of criminal activity are related to the wealth and assets of the potential targets 
(Enamorado et al., 2016, p.130). The second approach is based on sociological 
theories of crime by Elgar (1938), who focuses on emotional feelings that lead 
people to become delinquents. According to this theory, individuals low in the 
social structure are frustrated by their failure to attain the material attributes of 
success, and this failure is more galling when they are confronted by the success of 
those around them (cf., Kelly, 2000). Poor people would be more likely to become 
violent in a place where inequality is high when compared with a similar individual 
living in a more egalitarian society (Fajnzylber et al., 2002). In short, both theories 
strongly suggest that higher levels of inequality boost crime, even after controlling 
poverty levels.  
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In general, climate, scarce environmental resources and other socioeconomic 
factors can generate a ‚blockage of goal-seeking behavior‛ (Agnew, 1985, passim) 
and stimulate aggressive behavior and violence (Mackintosh et al., 1975; Altman, 
1975; Baldassare, 1975; Verbrugge & Taylor, 1980; Regoeczi, 2003; Schuurman & 
Horgan, 2016). In particular, inequality and poverty can produce deteriorated 
human functioning that leads to crime as a result (Christens & Speer, 2005; Coccia, 
2017e). In other words, socioeconomic inequality, combined with high density of 
population, hot climate and other factors, may generate high levels of 
psychological stress in society (e.g., frustration and anger) that most likely induce 
environmental violence (Regoeczi, 2003). However, although various studies about 
the relation between environmental stressors of human behavior and violence in 
society have been proposed, convincing and comprehensive arguments of the 
sources of violent crime in different geoeconomic areas are still hardly known. 
Specifically, the interaction between climate and income inequality has been 
largely ignored to explain the sources of frustration, anger and violent crime in 
society. 
Theoretical frameworks just discussed above suggest a general relation between 
income inequality and violent crime across space and time that can lay the 
theoretical foundations to posit and explore the following working hypothesis.  
Suppose that:  
a) Countries of the Tropical zone have a warmer climate than countries of 
Temperate zone, ceteris paribus 
b) Intentional homicides are an indicator of violent crime in society 
c) Income inequality is a socioeconomic stressor both in rich and in poor 
countries 
This study intends to substantiate the following focal hypothesis: 
Inequality Hypothesis: Economic inequality negatively influences human 
functioning and leads to violent crime in society, ceteris paribus (i.e., controlling) 
the climate. 
Remark: the hypothesis supposes that the income inequality, rather than hot 
temperature per se, is a stimulant of violent crime. Hence, the income inequality 
can be an invariant factor across time and space to explain the rate of violent crime 
in society, such as rates of intentional homicide. 
The purpose of the present study is to see whether statistical evidence supports 
the hypothesis that the violent crime, measured with intentional homicides (per 
100,000 people), can be explained by the high level of income inequality, 
measured with Gini coefficient, controlling the climate. Therefore, this study here 
has the goal of clarifying, as far as possible, the relation between socioeconomic 
inequality and high rates of violent crime in society, controlling (ceteris paribus) 
the climate factor of countries. 
 
Table 1. Variables, descriptions and sources of data 
- Latitude 
Acronym: LAT 
Source of data: GeoNames, 2016; Mapszoom, 2016. 
 
 Latitude is an important factor for determining 
climate of countries.  
- GDP per capita PPP current Int. $ (2006) 
Acronym: GDPPC2006y 
Source of data: World Bank (2008); Norris (2015). 
 
 Gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) by 
purchasing power parity, 2006y. The gross domestic 
product (GDP) is the value of all goods and services 
produced minus the value of any goods or services used 
in their creation. 
- Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) 
2006-2013 
Acronym: HOM2006-13y 
Source of data: World Development Indicators - The 
World Bank Group (2014). 
 
 Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)
 from UN Office on Drugs and Crime's International 
Homicide Statistics database. Intentional homicides are 
estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a 
result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, 
violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence 
over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing 
by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include 
all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the 
organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups 
usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed 
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conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive groups 
of up to several hundred members and is thus usually 
excluded. Period under study is 2006-2013.  
- Income Gini coefficient 2004  
Acronym: GINI2004y 
Source of data: World Bank (2013); Norris (2015). 
 
 Income Gini coefficient 2004y. Measure of the 
deviation of the distribution of income among 
individuals or households within a country from a 
perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents 
absolute equality, a value of 100 absolute (social and 
economic) inequality.  
- Population ages 0-14 (% of total 2003) 
Acronym: POPY0-14 
Source of data: World Bank (2004); Norris (2015). 
 Population ages 0-14 (% of total 2003), this is an 
indicator of young in population. 
 
3. Methods  
The method of condition-seeking of the study here has to purpose to analyse 
whether under the condition of high socioeconomic inequality, the violent crime 
increases, even after the climate of countries is controlled (cf. Greenwald et al., 
1986). This factor of socioeconomic inequality, within and between countries, can 
be considered a competitor variable to perform a ‚destructive testing‛ of the heat 
hypothesis (Anderson & Anderson, 1996).  
The sample of this study focuses on 191 countries. The approach here is based 
on aggregate data at country level to calculate the arithmetic mean of variables 
over time and perform a cross-section analysis. The variables under study are in 
table 1.  
Latitudes are a fairly good measure to detect, in average, the climate of 
countries (cf., Anderson & Anderson, 1996, p. 744). In particular, this study 
divides the countries in two geographical zones.  
Tropics are between 23.5S and 23.5N latitude (countries have average high 
temperatures).   
Countries from 23.5N to 66.5N and between 23.5S and 66.5S are into the 
temperate zones with clear spring/summer/fall/winter seasons (see, world map of 
the Köppen-Geiger climate classification; Kottek et al., 2006, p. 260ff).  
The violent crime is measured with the Intentional homicides (per 100,000 
people) at aggregated level (i.e., country) to suggest inferences about the average 
violent crime rate across nations. This study does not consider other typologies of 
aggressive behavior such as rape, assault, etc. because they may be underreported 
and generate systematic bias in the analysis (cf., Anderson & Anderson, 1996, 
p.744). The socioeconomic inequality of countries is measured by Income Gini 
coefficient (Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among 
households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution). This variable can 
be a strong indicator of socioeconomic stress within countries (cf., Fajnzylber et 
al., 2002). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita by purchasing power parity is 
the most common indicator in socioeconomic studies to measure the economic 
activity and wealth of nations. GDP is the control variable in some statistical 
analyses performed here.  
 
 
Figure 1. Invariant relation between climate and socioeconomic inequality for explaining 
the source of violent crime 
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The study here assumes that the climate (and related temperature) affects 
primarily the natural and economic environment of countries and it is this 
socioeconomic system that in turn influences people and their behavior, rather than 
to conjecture a linear cause-and-effect linkage from hot temperature to violent 
crime in society by-passing socioeconomic factors (in fact, between the 
temperature and human behavior there is the socioeconomic environment; Fig. 1-
2). The idea of the study is to explain the high violent crime from a socioeconomic 
perspective, considering the level of income inequality as principal driver of 
environmental stress in society, in a comparable geoeconomic area with similar 
climate. 
Figure 1 shows the visual representation of the theoretical interplay between 
climate and socioeconomic inequality that can lead to violent crime.  
 
 
Figure 2. Model from high economic and social inequality to environmental stressors that 
induce deteriorated human functioning and violent crime in society, ceteris paribus the 
climate. 
 
Evidence of hypothesis is based on following statistical analyses: 
Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlation and partial correlation (with control 
variables Latitude and/or GDP per capita).  
Independent Samples T Test (a parametric test) that compares the arithmetic 
means of Intentional homicides of two independent sets (i.e., Countries with Gini 
coefficient higher/lowerthan arithmetic mean, both within and between Tropical 
and Temperate areas) in order to determine whether there is statistical evidence of 
significant difference.  
In particular, the null hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1) of the 
independent samples T test are given by: 
 
H0: µ1 = µ2 H1: µ1  µ2 
 
with:  
µ1 = arithmetic mean of Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) within 
countries with Gini coefficient lower than average value (in Tropical and 
Temperate zones). 
µ2 = arithmetic mean of Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) within 
countries with Gini coefficient higher than average value (in Tropical and 
Temperate zones). 
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Regression analysis with linear models of simple and multiple regression. The 
specification of the model of simple regression is: 
 
tititi
uxY ,,10,   (countryi=1, …, n); t=time 
 
where: 
Yi,t (Dependent variable) = the Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) 
xi,t = Gini coefficient of income inequality, which is the explanatory variable  
ui,t= Error term  
The linear model of multiple regression is given by: 
 
titititi kxY ,,2,10,    (countryi=1, …, n), t=time 
 
where: 
Yi,t (Dependent variable) = the Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) 
xi,t = Gini coefficient of income inequality, which is the first explanatory 
variable  
ki,t = Latitude, which is the second explanatory variable  
i,t= Error term  
The goodness of fit is measured with the coefficient of determination R2. These 
models are estimated with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The 
expectation of these statistical analyses is that, fixed the latitude (climate of 
countries), high rates of intentional homicide are associated to countries with high 
income inequality: i.e., the high rates of violent crime can be explained by high 
values of economic inequality, rather than hot temperature of certain geoeconomic 
areas per se. Statistical analyses are performed by using the Statistics Software 
SPSS version 15.0. 
 
4. Statistical evidence  
This study endeavors to explain the violent crime by a socioeconomic cause that 
negatively affects the human functioning, even after the climate of countries is 
controlled. The evidence is presented with a general analysis considering all 
countries and a specific analysis of Tropical vs. Temperate climate countries.  
 
4.1. General analysis of all countries 
Table 1A in Appendix A shows descriptive statistics. In particular, the 
logarithmic transformation of variables shows normal distributions for appropriate 
statistical (parametric) analyses.  
 
Table 2. Bivariate correlation  
 LN 
 GINI2004y 
LN  
HOM2006-13y 
LN  
GDPPC2006y 
LN GINI2004y 
Pearson Correlation 1   
Sig. (2-tailed)    
N 126   
LN HOM2006-13y 
Pearson Correlation 0.63** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01  
N 124 183  
LN GDPPC2006y 
Pearson Correlation -0.33** -0.39** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0.01 
N 126 183 191 
Note: LN is logarithm; **= Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). GINI2004y= Income 
Gini coefficient 2004; HOM2006-13y= Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) 2006-2013; 
GDPPC2006y= GDP per capita PPP current Int. $ (2006). 
 
Table 2 shows a very high coefficient of Pearson correlation (63%), which 
indicates a strong (positive) linear relationship between income inequality and 
Intentional homicides with 1% of statistical significance (p<0.01). This study also 
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found a negative linear relationship between Intentional homicides and GDP per 
capita (r = 0.39, p<0.01).  
An important result is in table 3 with the partial correlation. This correlation 
indicates a strong (positive) relationship between income inequality and Intentional 
homicides, fixed the latitude and GDP per capita of countries (r=0.503, p<0.001). 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis stated above about the effect of rising 
socioeconomic inequality on high rates of violent crime, ceteris paribus climate and 
income per capita (GDP per capita PPP current Int. $).  
 
Table 3. Partial correlation  
 
Control Variables 
LN HOM 
2006-13y 
LN GINI 
2004y 
Latitude & 
LN GDPPC2006y 
LN HOM 2006-13y 
Correlation 1  
Significance (2-tailed) .  
df 0  
LN GINI 2004y 
Correlation 0.503 1 
Significance (2-tailed) 0.001 . 
df 120 0 
Note: LN is logarithm; GINI2004y= Income Gini coefficient 2004; HOM2006-13y= Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 people) 2006-2013; GDPPC2006y= GDP per capita PPP current Int. $ 
(2006). 
 
Table 4. Independent Samples Test with Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) 2006-
2013y period 
 GINI coefficient 2004y N Mean*) SD Std. Error Mean 
LN HOM 2006-13y GINI 2004y≥ 40 
54 2.18 1.06 0.14 
GINI 2004y< 40 70 0.82 0.91 0.11 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances T-test for Equality of Means 
 F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 0.09 0.76 7.72 122.0 0.001 
Equal variances not assumed     7.57 104.9 0.001 
Note: SD= Standard Deviation; GINI2004y= Income Gini coefficient 2004; *)= HOM2006-13y= 
Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) 2006-2013. 
 
Table 4 shows basic information (arithmetic mean and SD) of Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 people) over 2006-2013 about countries with the income 
inequality (GINI 2004y) higher/lower than 40 (arithmetic mean). In general, 
countries with economic inequality higher than arithmetic mean (GINI 2004y 
=Gini coefficient ≥40) have also a high value of Intentional homicides (267.32% 
higher!) in comparison to countries with GINI 2004y<40 (cf., 1-2 row in tab. 4). 
Since the T-test for Equality of Means has p<0.001, we can reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the arithmetic mean of these two sets (i.e., income 
inequality higher/lower than arithmetic mean) is significantly different.  
 
Table 5. Regressions of Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) equations 
Note: ***=Coefficient is significant at p<0.001 
 
Dependent variable: LN Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) average 2006-2013 
  
x 
Gini coefficient of 
income inequality 
k 
 
Latitude 
 
 
Models 
Constant 
0 
(St. Err.) 
Coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
Coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 
(St. Err. of 
the Estimate) 
F 
 
(Sign.) 
1.  Explanatory variable 
o Gini coefficient of 
income inequality 2004y 
9.43*** 
(1.22) 
2.97*** 
(0.33) -- 
0.30 
(0.93) 
79.56 
(0.001) 
 
2.  Explanatory variables 
o Gini coefficient of 
income inequality 2004y 
o Latitude 
 
9.43*** 
(1.76) 
2.96*** 
(0.46) 
0.00001805 
(0.004) 
0.39 
(0.93) 
39.45 
(0.001) 
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OLS estimation of models of regression analysis is in table 5. These results 
indicate a reasonably R2 of the estimated models 1 and 2 of 0.30 and 0.39 
respectively, which implies that more than 30% of the variation in the Intentional 
homicides can be attributed (linearly) to Gini coefficient of income inequality. The 
coefficient of regression 1 of the model 2 indicates that a 1% higher income 
inequality, ceteris paribus the latitude, increases the expected Intentional homicides 
(per 100,000 people) by about 2.96% (cf., geometric representation is in Fig. 3).  
Figure 3 shows that countries with warm climate are in the North-East corner 
but these are also countries with a strong association between high socioeconomic 
inequality and violent crime. Vice versa the South-West corner has mainly 
countries with temperate climate, lower income inequality and violent crime.  
 
 
Figure 3. Regression line of Intentional homicide on income Gini coefficient 
 
4.2. Statistical analyses of Tropical vs. Temperate climate countries  
Table 2A in Appendix A shows descriptive statistics of variables understudy for 
Tropical and Temperate climate zone. Logarithmic transformation shows normal 
distribution of variables for applying correct statistical analyses (cf. also Appendix 
B). First of all, the Tropical Zone has higher average values of Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 people) and of economic inequality. 
Table 6 shows a high coefficient of correlation in Tropical zone between 
income inequality (GINI) and Intentional homicides (HOM). The Pearson 
correlation is 38% and indicates a good (positive) linear relationship between 
income inequality and Intentional homicides with statistical significance (p<0.01).  
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Table 6. Bivariate correlation for Tropical and Temperate climate zone 
 
Tropical Zone  
(23°27'N-23°27'S) 
LN 
GINI2004y 
LN 
HOM2006-13y 
LN 
GDPPC2006y 
LN GINI2004y 
Pearson Correlation 1   
Sig. (2-tailed)    
N 59   
LN HOM2006-13y 
Pearson Correlation 0.38** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003   
N 57 98  
LN GDPPC2006y 
Pearson Correlation 0.28* 0.03 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.03 0.78  
N 59 98 103 
Temperate climate Zone 
(>23°27'N and S)  
LN 
GINI2004y 
LN 
HOM2006-13y 
LN 
GDPPC2006y 
LN GINI2004y 
Pearson Correlation 1   
Sig. (2-tailed)    
N 67   
LN HOM2006-13y 
Pearson Correlation 0.60** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01   
N 67 85  
LN GDPPC2006y 
Pearson Correlation 0.28* 0.51** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.01  
N 67 85 86 
 
 
Note: LN is logarithm; **= Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; *= Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level (2-tailed); GINI2004y = Income Gini coefficient 2004; HOM2006-13y= Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 people) 2006-2013; GDPPC2006y= GDP per capita PPP current Int. $ 
(2006). 
 
The statistical analysis of this study also found a positive linear relationship 
between Intentional homicides and GDP per capita in Tropical zone (r=0.28, 
p<0.05). Temperate climate zone has a very high coefficient of correlation between 
income inequality and Intentional homicides: it is about 60% and indicates a strong 
(positive) linear relationship with 1 per cent of statistical significance (p<0.01). 
This study also found, in this temperate zone, a negative linear relationship 
between Intentional homicides and GDP per capita (r = 0.28, p<0.05).  This result 
can be explained with better institutions and high wellbeing of developed areas that 
decrease violent crime in comparison to countries of tropical area with poor 
institutional arrangements (cf., Acemoglu et al., 2001). Partial correlation in table 7 
also provides important results. This correlation indicates in Tropical zone a good 
(positive) relationship between income inequality and Intentional homicides, fixed 
the latitude and GDP per capita of countries (r=0.38, p<0.01). Temperate climate 
zone confirms this result with a higher coefficient of partial correlation (r=0.46, 
p<0.01).  
 
Table 7. Partial correlation for Tropical and Temperate climate zone 
Control Variables  
Latitude & LN GDPPC2006y 
LN HOM 
2006-13y 
LN GINI 
2004y 
Tropical Zone  
(23°27'N-23°27'S) 
LN HOM 2006-13 
Correlation 1  
Significance (2-tailed) .  
df 0  
LN GINI 2004y 
Correlation 0.38 1 
Significance (2-tailed) 0.004 . 
df 53 0 
Control Variables  
Latitude & LN GDPPC2006y 
LN HOM 
2006-13y 
LN GINI 
2004y 
Temperate climate Zone 
 (>23°27' N and S) 
LN HOM 2006-13 
Correlation 1  
Significance (2-tailed) .  
df 0  
LN GINI 2004y 
Correlation 0.46 1 
Significance (2-tailed) 0.01 . 
df 63 0 
Note: LN is logarithm; GINI2004y = Income Gini coefficient 2004; HOM2006-13y= Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 people) 2006-2013; GDPPC2006y= GDP per capita PPP current Int. $ 
(2006).  
 
Table 8 shows that Tropical zone has a higher arithmetic mean of economic 
inequality measured with GINI coefficient 2004y (GINI 2004y=46 in Tropical 
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zone, whereas GINI 2004y=35 in Temperate climate zone). The hot zone of the 
globe confirms that the subset of countries with income inequality higher than 
arithmetic mean (i.e., GINI 2004y≥46) has also a high value of Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 people) over 2006-2013y (HOM 2006-13y is 2.39) in 
comparison to countries having economic inequality lower than mean GINI 
2004y<46 (i.e., HOM 2006-13y is 1.73). This regularity is confirmed in temperate 
climate areas (HOM 2006-13y is 1.22 in countries with economic inequality higher 
than mean, i.e., GINI 2004y≥35, whereas average intentional homicide is 0.56 in 
the subset of countries with average economic inequality lower than arithmetic 
mean GINI 2004y<35, see table 8). Since the T-test for Equality of Means in table 
8 has both in Tropical and in Temperate climate zone p<0.05, we can reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the arithmetic mean of these two subsets is 
significantly different at 5%. In general, countries of the same climate zone with 
high (average) income inequality have a high (average) value of Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 people) over 2006-2013.  
 
Table 8. Independent Samples Test with Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) 2006-
2013 for Tropical and Temperate climate zone 
Tropical Zone (23°27'N-23°27'S) 
 GINI coefficient 2004y N Mean* Std.  
Dev. 
Std. Error Mean 
LN HOM 2006-13y GINI 2004y≥ 46 28 2.39 1.06 0.20 
GINI 2004y< 46 29 1.73 1.05 0.20 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances T-test for Equality of Means 
 F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
Equal variances assumed 0.005 0.94 2.35 55.00 0.02 
Equal variances not assumed     2.35 54.90 0.02 
Temperate climate Zone (>23°27'N and S) 
 GINI coefficient 2004y N Mean* Std.  
Dev. 
Std. Error Mean 
LN HOM 2006-13y GINI 2004y≥ 35 31 1.22 1.02 0.18 
GINI 2004y< 35 36 0.56 0.82 0.14 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances T-test for Equality of Means 
 F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
Equal variances assumed 2.206 0.14 2.96 65.00 0.004 
Equal variances not assumed     2.91 57.63 0.005 
Note: LN is logarithm; GINI2004y = Income Gini coefficient 2004; *= HOM2006-13y= Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 people) 2006-2013. 
 
OLS estimation for Tropical and Temperate climate zone produces the results in 
table 9 that shows positive coefficients of regression for linear models. In 
particular, Tropical zone with hot climate indicates that a 1% higher income 
inequality, ceteris paribus latitude (proxy of climate and temperature), increases the 
expected violent crime measured with Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) 
by about 2.5% (model 2)! Similar results for Temperate climate areas.  
 
Table 9. Regressions of Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) equations for Tropical 
and Temperate climate zone 
Dependent variable: LN Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) average 2006-2013 
Explanatory variable  
x 
Gini 
coefficient 
of income 
inequality 
k 
 
 
 
Latitude 
 
 
Models for  
Tropical areas 
 (23°27'N-23°27'S) 
Constant 
0 
(St. Err.) 
coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 
(St. Err. 
of the 
Estimate) 
F 
 
(Sign.) 
1.  
Gini coefficient of  
income inequality 2004y 
5.73* 
(2.55) 
2.05** 
(0.67) -- 
0.13 
(1.03) 
9.32 
(0.003) 
 
2.  
Gini coefficient of income 
inequality 2004y; 
Latitude 
 
7.62** 
(2.66) 
2.52*** 
(0.69) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.18 
(0.99) 
6.96 
(0.002) 
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Note:  ***=Coefficient is significant at p<0. 001; **=Coefficient is significant at p<0.01; 
*=Coefficient is significant at p<0. 05. 
 
Overall then, the statistical evidence shows the systematic differences of 
arithmetic mean of intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) between countries 
with high and low socioeconomic inequality, fixed (i.e. controlling) the latitude 
(Climate factor). These results here seem in general to support the hypothesis 
stated that the high violent crime can be explained with the economic inequality, 
controlling the climate of countries, both in Tropical and in Temperate climate 
zone.  
 
5. Discussion  
The heat hypothesis in social psychology makes a clear prediction that warmer 
regions should have higher aggression rates (Anderson & Anderson, 1996, p.745). 
However, the study here shows that, controlling the climate factor, high violent 
crime at country level can be explained by high income inequality, which has high 
values in warmer geoeconomic areas. Why income inequality is higher in countries 
with hot climate, e.g. Tropical zone? One of contributing factors seems to be the 
historical developmental paths. Acemoglu et al., (2001) argue that in regions where 
Europeans faced very high mortality rates, such as Tropical zones with hot 
temperature and Malaria, they could set up extractive states with the intention of 
transferring resources rapidly to the metropole. These institutions were detrimental 
to investment, rule of law and economic progress of these regions and persisted to 
the present (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p.1395). These determinants of whether 
Europeans could go and settle in these regions with high mortality and hot 
temperature, therefore, have had negative effects on historical developmental paths 
of countries and their institutions today: current low economic growth, 
democratization, high poverty and socioeconomic inequality have created aversive 
environments that lead to high criminality in society (cf., Ferreira et al., 2016; 
Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Fajnzylber et al., 2002). This argument of detrimental 
institutions and rule of laws in countries with hot temperature, due to historical 
developmental paths, can also explain the question by Anderson & Anderson 
(1996) of how heat may have contributed to the development of a southern culture 
of violence. In short, the statistical analysis here seems to show that income 
inequality, ceteris paribus climate, can lead to aversive environments and violent 
crime as a result. Mutatis mutandis, the socioeconomic inequality can also explain 
the high crime rate within specific areas of cities with problematic socioeconomic 
factors (cf., Cahill & Mulligan, 2003). This result is consistent with the 
socioeconomic literature that high rates of homicide tend to be positively and 
significantly associated to high levels of inequality in the distribution of income 
despite an extensive list of conceptually relevant controls (Messner & Rosenfeld, 
1997; Lee & Bankston, 1999, Daly et al., 2001; The Equality Trust, 2011). Elgar & 
Aitken (2010) also confirm that inequality is related to homicide independently of 
local context. 
Now a question is: why and how economic inequality induces to high growth 
rates of intentional homicide despite controlling factors such as climate? We now 
move on to discuss and explain the relation between economic inequality, human 
Models for  
Temperate climate areas 
Zone(>23°27'N and S) 
Constant 
0 
(St. Err.) 
coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 
(St. Err. 
of the 
Estimate) 
F 
 
(Sign.) 
1. 
Gini coefficient of  
income inequality 2004y 
8.39*** 
(1.52) 
2.617*** 
(0.43) -- 
0.35 
(0.78) 
37.01 
(0.001) 
 
2. 
Gini coefficient of income 
inequality 2004y 
Latitude 
 
9.12*** 
(2.18) 
2.80*** 
(0.58) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
.35 
(0.78) 
18.40 
(0.001) 
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behavior and violence, trying, as far as possible, to clarify the problem just 
mentioned. Socioeconomic inequality tends to increase mainly in regions with a 
higher population density and a lower level of household income with subsequent 
increase of residential crime (cf., Cahill & Mulligan, 2003; Christens & Speer, 
2005). This positive correlation between higher population density, income 
inequality and crime can be also explained with the association between high 
density of people and poverty (Curtis, 1975). In fact, high growth rates of 
population generate a high number of young population that, in the presence of 
poverty and high economic inequality, can be unable to achieve valuated goals. 
Data show that Population ages 0-14 (% of total) in 2003 was 37.6 in Tropical 
zones and 24.3 in Temperate climate zones. The ‚blockage of goal-seeking 
behavior‛ (Agnew, 1985, passim) of young people is a source of frustration and in 
certain environments that are aversive and painful may stimulate aggressive 
behavior and violence (Mackintosh et al., 1975; Altman, 1975; Baldassare, 1975; 
Verbrugge & Taylor, 1980; Agnew, 1985). In other words, high density of 
population and the unbalanced growth of geoeconomic system in the space 
(Hirshman, 1969) generate income inequality that negatively influences social 
relations and leads to deteriorated human functioning and violence (Baum & 
Paulus, 1991; Regoeczi, 2003, p.457; cf., Altman, 1975; Lepore et al., 1991). The 
relationship between inequality and crime is also explained with sociological 
theories on crime, such as the theory of ‚relative deprivation‛: inequality breeds 
social tensions and the less well-off individuals feel dispossessed when compared 
with wealthier people (Stack, 1984). Hsieh & Pugh (1993) argue that poverty and 
income inequality are an indicator of resource deprivation, which is associated to 
homicide. Arthur (1991) also finds that the homicides can be explained with an 
individual’s reaction to resource deprivation or material disadvantage that causes 
subsequent personal frustration and diffuse hostility (cf., Nettler, 1984, p.229). 
Stolzenberg et al., (2006) confirm that sociological explanations of crime are based 
on economic deprivation that acts as a motivational factor in the manifestation of 
crime. In short, economic inequality engenders resentment, hostility, frustration, 
and is a precipitating factor in the impetus of criminal behavior (Blau & Blau, 
1982). Messner & Golden (1992) extend the arguments by Blau & Schwartz (1984) 
with the thesis of the ‚‘relative deprivation’ …the consciousness of the 
disadvantaged, their realization of their common economic interests, and that the 
inability of the disadvantaged to get a fair redistribution of resources, or more open 
access to wealth, generates anger and frustration, which ultimately leads to more 
crime‛ (Stolzenberg et al., 2006, p.304, original emphasis). This socio-
psychological foundation of relative deprivation due to high income inequality 
‚reduces one's ability to compete for scarce jobs by imposing standards of 
competition that those individuals cannot realistically be expected to meet, and, 
therefore, it is directly related to involvement in crime and violence as those 
individuals adapt to that reality in any way they can‛ (Kovandzic et al., 1998, 
p.590). The feeling of disadvantage and unfairness leads the poor people to seek 
compensation and satisfaction by all means, including committing crimes against 
both poor and rich individuals (Fajnzylber et al., 2002). In other words, economic 
inequality generates crime via psychosocial processes based on negative social 
interactions, human behavior and sense of control over one's life, combined with 
loneliness, tension, anxiety and depression (cf. Elgar & Aitken, 2010). According 
to Gillan (2001), the inequality affects personality of people generating disrespect, 
loss of face and humiliation which are amongst the most common triggers to 
violence. Daly et al. (2001) confirm that the distribution of wealth, rather than level 
of wealth, influences rates of murder and manslaughter. In addition, the 
relationship income inequality and violent crime in specific tropical and temperate 
zones can also generate a reverse causality because rising crime rates affect 
inequality by encouraging richer residents to move out of violent locations 
(Enamorado et al., 2016). Hence, economic inequality and other socioeconomic 
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factors, even after the climate is controlled, increase the poverty and cultural 
deviance that generate high rates of violent crime (Regoeczi, 2003).  
 
6. Concluding observations 
On the basis of the argument presented in this paper, we can therefore conclude 
that one of the sources of violent crime across countries can be also explained by 
high levels of economic inequality, ceteris paribus latitude (a proxy of climate and 
temperature). This socioeconomic factor could be a useful competitor variable for a 
destructive testing of the heat hypothesis to increase the likelihood of a theoretical 
links in social psychology between high economic inequality and crime rates 
across countries to explain aggressive behavior of humans. As a matter of fact, the 
hot climate can be an illusory cause of mental stress and deteriorated human 
functioning leading to violence, because the hot temperature may not be an 
environmental stressor per se, whereas a high socioeconomic inequality can lead to 
aversive environment, frustration, anger and violent crime in problematic 
geoeconomic areas, ceteris paribus the climate. 
To sum up, the contributions of this study are that: 
(1) The conceptual framework here assigns a central role to income inequality 
to explain deteriorated human functioning conducive to violent crime; 
(2) The conceptual framework here is able to explain the source of high violent 
crime by high levels of income inequality both in Tropical and in Temperate 
climate areas. This socioeconomic stressor of inequality can be generalized, 
whenever possible, to explain the source of violence between and within countries 
and cities, controlling the climate factor; 
(3) Societies with low socioeconomic inequality, high standard of living, 
quality of life and multiple opportunities for advancement of young generations are 
not likely to produce violent crime, ceteris paribus the climate. 
(4) One future scenario might be that the increasing economic inequality within 
and between countries (World Bank, 2013) can feed high rates of violent crime for 
many years to come. 
Programs of economic aid for one or more societies/cities/communities with 
high economic and social inequality would be appropriate policies to reduce this 
socioeconomic stressor and, as a consequence, the environmental violence. In fact, 
a political economy of growth directed to poor societies can increase economic 
prosperity to lower the economic inequality that set the stage for aversive 
environments and cultural deviance leading to violent crime over the long run. 
Fajnzylber et al., (2002) also claim that the growth rate and distribution of income 
reduce the poverty, and the rate of poverty alleviation has a crime-reducing effect.  
Some scholars also argue that crime levels are expected to decline in the future 
because of investment in R&D and research labs, technology transfer, improved 
enforcement technologies and possible rising economic growth, but these expected 
results have to be considered together with other factors such as the possible 
increase of income inequality, population growth, public debt, recessions and 
economic turmoil, migration flows, global warming, etc.1. 
Overall, then, the deteriorated human functioning is due to manifold factors. 
This study seems to show that, controlling the climate, the income inequality is a 
general socioeconomic stressor for human behavior that can be conducive to 
frustrated and angry people, and violent crime as a result (Schuurman & Horgan, 
2016; Agnew 1985; Christens & Speer, 2005; Anderson, 2001). However, 
 
1Cf. also Calabrese et al., 2005; Cariola & Coccia, 2004; Cavallo et al., 2014, 2014a, 2015; Coccia, 
2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006, 2006a, 2007, 2008, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 
2009a, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2011, 2012, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2013, 
2013a, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f, 2014g, 2015, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 
2015d, 2016, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2018, Coccia & Bozeman, 
2016; Coccia & Finardi, 2012, 2013; Coccia & Wang, 2015, 2016; Coccia & Cadario, 2014; Coccia 
et al., 2015, 2012, Coccia & Rolfo, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2012, 2007, 2010, 2010, 2013; Coccia & 
Wang, 2015, 2016; Rolfo & Coccia, 2005. 
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conclusions of this study are tentative because we know that complex drivers of 
aggressive behavior in society are often not equal over time and space. The study 
here to analysis did not permit some intervening variables that may have been 
useful in providing a deeper and richer explanation of these phenomena of 
interests. Hence, much work remains if we are to understand in more depth the 
reasons for and the implications of environmental stressors of human behavior 
conducive to violent crime. To conclude, there is need for much more detailed 
research into the relations among geographical, socioeconomic and cultural factors 
and human behavior to explain the comprehensive drivers of cultural deviance and 
violence in society. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1A. Descriptive statistics of all countries  
 Intentional homicides 
(per 100,000 people) 
Average 
2006-2013y 
LN 
Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 
people) Average 
2006-2013y 
GDP per capita 
PPP 
2006y 
LN 
GDP per capita 
PPP 2006y 
GINI 
coefficient 
2004y 
LN 
GINI 
coefficient 
2004y 
N Valid 191 183 191 191 126 126 Missing 0 8 0 0 65 65 
Mean 7.62 1.44 $7455.72 7.82 40.14 3.66 
Std. Deviation 10.78 1.14 $10780.67 1.60 10.36 0.25 
Skewness 3.12 0.10 1.86 0.06 0.63 0.16 
Kurtosis 11.42 -0.49 2.81 -0.97 -0.27 -0.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2A. Descriptive statistics for Tropical and Temperate climate zone 
 
 
Tropical Zone 
 
(23°27'N-23°27'S) 
Intentional homicides 
(per 100,000 people) 
Average 
2006-2013y 
LN 
Intentional 
homicides (per 100,000 
people) Average 2006-
2013y 
GDP per capita 
PPP 2006y 
LN 
GDP per capita 
PPP 2006y 
GINI 
coefficient 
2004y 
LN 
GINI 
coefficient 
2004y 
N Valid 103 98 103 103 59 59 
Missing 0 5 0 0 44 44 
Mean 10.55 1.92 $3343.19 7.13 45.78 3.80 
Std. Deviation 12.70 1.03 $5729.89 1.41 9.26 0.21 
Skewness 2.65 -0.34 3.18 0.29 0.27 -0.20 
Kurtosis 7.71 0.69 10.61 -0.72 -0.22 -0.45 
Temperate climate Zone  
(>23°27'N and S)       
N 
Valid 86 85 86 86 67 67 
Missing 0 1 0 0 19 19 
Mean 4.28 0.88 $12091.27 8.62 35.17 3.53 
Std. Deviation 6.57 1.00 $12888.62 1.42 8.63 0.22 
Skewness 3.61 0.71 1.08 -0.27 1.47 0.79 
Kurtosis 14.62 0.14 0.27 -0.99 2.43 0.66 
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Appendix B. Box Plot of variables 
 
 
Figure 1B. Box plot of intentional homicide and Gini coefficient in Tropical zone 
 
 
 
Figure 2B. Box plot of intentional homicide and Gini coefficient in Temperate zone 
 
 
Table 1B. Statistics 
 Homicide Average 2006-13 GINI coefficient (UNDP 2004) 
Tropical Zone 
(23°27'N-23°27'S) 
N Valid 103 59 
Missing 0 44 
Median 7.085 45.20 
Range 71.85 42.00 
Minimum 0.00 29.00 
Maximum 71.85 71.00 
Percentiles 25 3.52 39.00 
50 7.08 45.20 
75 11.21 50.90 
NON tropical Zone 
(>23°27'N and S) 
N Valid 86 67 
Missing 0 19 
Median 1.91 33.10 
Range 39.56 3.01 
Minimum 0.00 24.00 
Maximum 39.56 63.00 
Percentiles 25 1.14 29.00 
50 1.91 33.10 
75 4.78 37.90 
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